Abstract-This paper studies the physical consequences of a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in which both state and topology data for a sub-network of the network are changed by an attacker to mask a physical attack. The problem is formulated as a two-stage optimization problem which aims to cause overload in a line of the network with limited attack resources. It is shown that unobservable stateand-topology cyber-physical attacks as studied in this paper can make the system operation more vulnerable to line outages and failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE electric power system is a complex cyber-physical system and is monitored by an intelligent which includes: (i) a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system; and (ii) an energy management system (EMS) that process the SCADA data. Network topology is important system data used in various data processing modules in the EMS. Changes in topology can result from either system incidents or malicious physical attacks; but, in general, such topology alterations can be detected in the cyber layer. However, a sophisticated attacker can launch cyber attacks that alter the topology information in an unobservable manner; furthermore, they can also mask a physical attack via a cyber attack to create a more coordinated attack. Such cyber-physical attacks can result in wrong EMS solutions with potential serious consequences. Therefore, it is instructive to fully understand such attack consequences as a first step to thwart them.
There has been much recent interest in understanding both the physical and cyber security challenges facing the electric power system. While there has been focus on the consequences of physical attacks on the system operation (e.g., [1] ), those of cyber as well as coordinated cyber-physical attacks are less understood. In this paper, we introduce a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in AC state estimation (SE) and focus on fully understanding its consequences.
A. State of Art
False data injection (FDI) attacks: In [2] , Liu et al. first introduce a class of FDI attacks on DC SE. In [3] , Hug and Giampapa focus on FDI attacks on AC SE and introduce a class of unobservable attacks that are limited to a subgraph of the networks. They demonstrate that though AC SE is vulnerable to unobservable FDI attacks, it requires the knowledge of both system topology and states to launch such attacks. More recently, the attacks in [4] by Liang et al. study attack consequences by introducing a class of unobservable FDI attacks for AC SE and demonstrate that such attacks can lead to a physical generation re-dispatch and line overflow.
Topology attacks: Unobservable cyber attacks on topology can be of two types: line-maintaining and line-removing. For a line-maintaining attack, the attacker changes measurements and line status information to make it appear that line that is not in the system is now shown as active at the control center via SCADA data; the opposite is achieved by a lineremoving attack. For both line-removing and line-maintaining attacks, an attack can either change only topology data (i.e., state-preserving topology attack) or both state and topology data (i.e., state-and-topology attack). The class of unobservable cyber topology attacks is first introduced in [5] ; however, the analysis in [5] is restricted to a subclass of state-preserving line-removing attacks in which an attacker changes topology information of the system without changing the states.
Line-maintaining attacks: This sub-class of topology attacks require both physical line outage and cyber attack to mask the physical topology alteration and have not been studied yet in the literature. In this work, we study the line-maintaining cyber-physical attacks in which both physical and cyber topology are changed by the attacker. In [6] , we consider unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining attacks (i.e., only topology data is changed) for which we develop an algorithm using breadth-first search (BFS) to find the smallest sub-network required to launch such an attack. However, changing only topology and not changing states limits the number of feasible lines amenable to attacks and also requires large load shifts at the end buses of a target line. Therefore, in this work, we determine attacks that change both state and topology.
Attack consequences: There has been much focus on effect of attacks on operation costs [7] , [8] and electricity markets [9] , [10] ; in contrast, as in [4] , [11] , this paper highlights physical system consequences of cyber-physical attacks. For cyber attacks whose goal is to effect electricity market and physical consequences, the attacks can be modeled as twostage optimization problems where the first stage models the attack design with constraints that capture attacker's limitation and the second stages models the system response (see [7] , [8] , [11] ). In this paper, we also use a two-stage optimization problem to find unobservable state-and-topology cyberphysical attack that can maximize power flow on a chosen line. Furthermore, due to the combination of physical and cyber attacks, we employ such a two-stage attack twice as detailed in the sequel.
B. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we introduce a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyberphysical attacks in which an attacker can change both cyber state and topology data to enable a coordinated physical and cyber attack on AC SE. Such an attack consists of a physical attack to first trip a transmission line, followed by a cyber attack that masks the physical attack. The goal is to overload a chosen line (different from tripped line) while avoiding being detected by both SE and the subsequent modules.
Our attack model also captures the realistic limitation that the attacker can only access a sub-network of the entire power system, and therefore, can take down a line and modify the measurements only inside the sub-network. To this end, we can solve a two-stage optimization problem to determine the attack. However, since both physical attack and the redispatch resulting from cyber attack can lead to state changes, two attack vectors are required to enable the above two state changes and ensure the unobservability of the attack. Therefore, we formulate a two-step strategy to determine the attack.
The second contribution of our work is to demonstrate the consequences of the worst cyber-physical attacks determined by the proposed attack strategy on AC SE and AC OPF. We show that the cyber-physical attacks introduced here can successfully lead to line overflows in the IEEE 24-bus system with limited size of attack sub-network and load shifts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II introduces the general system model. Sec. III introduces the attack model. Sec. IV presents a two-step attack strategy to identify the worst-case overflow attack. Sec. V analyzes the numerical results for a test system. Sec. VI draws the conclusion of this paper and presents the future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the mathematical formulation for the various computational units of power system operation, including system network and topology, state estimation, and optimal power flow. Throughout, we assume there are n b buses, n br branches, n g generators, and n z measurements in the system. In Fig. 1 , we illustrate a typical temporal sequence of data processing units in the cyber layer.
A. System Network and Topology
The electric power system can be represented by a graph G = {N , E} where N and E are the sets of buses and lines, respectively.
At the control center, SCADA collects line status data as a n br × 1 vector s with entries s k ∈ {0, 1} for k ∈ {1, ..., n br } that indicate the on and off status of circuit-breakers on each line. The data is then passed to a topology processor to map the real-time power system topology. Each s corresponds to a specific system topology G.
B. State Estimation
Consider an n z × 1 vector z of nonlinear measurements (for AC SE) given as
where
T is the system state vector, and e is an n z × 1 noise vector which is independent of x and is modeled as Gaussian distributed with 0 mean and σ 2 i covariance such that the measurement error covariance matrix is given by R = diag( σ
). The function h(x, G) is a vector of nonlinear functions that describes the relationship between the system states and measurements for a topology G.
We use weighted least-squares (WLS) AC SE to calculate the θ and V [12] . Subsequent to SE, bad data detector use χ 2 −test to detect bad data and bad data identification use largest normalized residual method to filter the bad data.
C. Optimal Power Flow
The OPF problem can be written as
T is the optimization vector with voltage angle θ, voltage magnitude V that are both n b × 1 vectors, and active power generation P G , reactive power generation Q G that are both n g × 1 vectors; C(·) denotes the cost function of x; F (·) denotes the equivalent constraints (power balance constraints); T (·) denotes the inequivalent constraints (power flow limits). 
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III. ATTACK MODEL
The unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attack considered here models both a physical attack and a coordinated cyber attack.
We assume the attacker has the following capabilities: 1) Attacker has knowledge of the topologyḠ 0 of entire network prior to physical attacks. 2) Attacker has the capability to launch physical attack, and observe and change measurements only for a sub-graph S of G 0 . The choice of S is described in detail in the sequel. 3) Attacker has the capability to perform SE and compute modified measurements for S. 4) Attacker has knowledge of the capacity and operation cost of every generator in the network. 5) Attacker has historic data of load patterns and generation dispatch of the entire network. We assume that the power system is observable before and after the physical attack.
In this paper, we focus only on physical attacks that target transmission lines. We denote the line that is physically tripped by the attacker as the switching attack line and the two end buses of this line as the switching attack buses. Assume the switching attack line is line t and the topology prior to the physical attack is G 0 . The physical line status for line t changes from s t = 1 to s t = 0 after the physical attack and the corresponding physical topology changes to G.
In general, a physical attack will be subsequently detected by the topology processing unit in the EMS and the system topology will be updated shortly after the detection. However, a sophisticated attacker can hide such physical attacks by launching an unobservable cyber attack. In the resulting unobservable cyber topology attack, the attacker modifies line status as well as related bus measurements to alter the system topology G to a different "target" topologyḠ = {N,Ē}. Since the attacker's aim is to hide the topology alteration caused by the physical attack,Ḡ should be chosen as G 0 .
To launch a state-and-topology attack, the attacker injects n br × 1 line status attack vector b and n z × 1 measurement attack vector a. The attack vector b for line status overrides the physical change on line t's status by setting for b k = 0 for k = t and b k = 1 for k = t. These changes lead to a new system statex for the system under attack. This attack modifies (s, z) for topology G to (s,z) for topologyḠ such that
In the absence of noise, the measurement attack vector satisfies
For nonlinear measurement model and AC SE, we model a sophisticated attacker who attacks measurements and line status data for a sub-graph S of the network by first estimating the system statesx inside S using AC SE. The attacker then chooses a small set of buses in S to change states from the estimatex tox =x + c such that the measurement vectorz after cyber attack has entries
where I S denotes the set of measurements inside S. We use the following method to identify the sub-graph S for an unobservable state-and-topology attack. Throughout, we distinguish two types of buses: load buses with presence of load and non-load buses with no load.
1) Use the optimization problem (the details are in the sequel) to determine the load buses from the attack vector c whose states need to be changed (defined as center bus) to enable the attack. 2) Include all center buses in S. 3) Extend S by including all buses and branches connected to the buses inside S. 4) If there are non-load buses on the boundary of S, extend S by including all adjacent buses of the non-load boundary buses and the corresponding branches. 5) Repeat 4) until all boundary buses of S are load buses. 6) Check if there is a path (actual bus and branch connection) in S that can connect the two switching attack buses. If such path exits, then S is the attack sub-graph.
If there is no such path, go to Step 7). 7) Use BFS method to find the shortest path connecting the two switching attack buses. Include the shortest path in S. Then this S is the attack sub-graph. Steps 1)−5) ensure the boundary buses of S are load buses with states unchanged. For a non-load bus in S, since the injection of non-load buses are known to the control center, the attacker should ensure that under an attack, the net injection is equal to the net flow into the bus. Thus, the state changes for non-load buses are dependent on those for the neighboring load buses. Furthermore, the state of a boundary bus j is computed using both measurements inside and outside S. From (8), if a measurement i for i / ∈ I S is dependent on the j th state, then the corresponding j th entry of the attack vector should satisfy c j = 0 to ensure the attack to be unobservable. Thus, a boundary bus cannot have a state change, and therefore, cannot be a non-load buses.
Steps 6) and 7) ensure that the states of switching attack buses can be estimated with measurements inside S. To maintain the switching attack line as active in the cyber layer, the attacker needs to modify the line status as well as power flow measurements on the switching attack line and power injection measurements on the switching attack buses. This in turn, requires the attacker to estimate the states of switching attack buses to create the false measurements. However, since this line is physically disconnected, the attacker needs to use an algorithm such as BFS to determine an alternate shortest path connecting the 2 switching attack buses, and thereby estimate the states and changed measurements. In general, state change is required for at least one of the switching attack buses. This bus, thereby, will be included in S. However, S may not include the entire physical path. Thus, the attacker needs steps 6) and 7) to complete the path.
IV. ATTACK STRATEGY In this section, we study the worst-case cyber-physical attacks. We assume the attacks can: (a) physically trip a switching attack line and mask the physical attack with a cyber attack; (b) maximize power flow on a target line; and (c) avoid detectability by limiting load shift via changes in measurements. The attack resources available to the attacker may also be limited. We model this limitation by constraining the size of sub-network the attacker has access to. This leads to a constrained optimization problem. As noted before, two attack vectors are needed for the physical and cyber parts of the attack and each optimization problem is described below.
Our two-step optimization problem captures the temporal nature of attack sequence involving a physical attack followed by several cyber attacks.
In Fig. 2 , we illustrate this temporal sequence of attack and system events. The system events are periodic and are denoted by S t for the t th event. At the start of each S t , data is collected from SCADA and by the end of S t , i.e., the start of S t+1 , data is processed in the EMS. There are 2 attacks instance, A 0 and A 1 to denote the physical and cyber attack events, respectively. We assume the physical attack event A 0 is launched immediately after the start of the 0 th system event, i.e., S 0 , and the coordinated cyber attack event A 1 is launched shortly after, but before the start of next system event S 1 . Following this cyber-physical attack pair (A 0 , A 1 ), the cyber attack is sustained between every two system events to maintain the worst generation dispatch, and thereby, sustain the maximal power flow on the target line. In TABLE I, we denote how the cyber (measured) and physical (actual) data including generation dispatch, system state, topology, and loads vary at all system and attack events. 
System and Attack Events
Assume the system topology and the generation at S 0 arē G and P 0 G , respectively. From TABLE I, we can see that the system physical topology changes to G after the physical attack. The physical operation states, thereby, change to θ 0 . The attacker then injects cyber attack vector c 0 to change the load pattern from the physical load P D to the false cyber load P D to mask the physical topology alteration. The physical and cyber loads at attack event A 1 satisfy the following relationships, respectively:
where A GN is n b × n g generator-to-bus connectivity matrix; H 1 andH 1 are n b × n b dependency matrices between power injection and voltage angle for G andḠ, respectively. When subtracting the two equations in (9), the cyber loads are related to the physical loads as
The false cyber loadP D and topologyḠ leads to a system redispatch to the optimal generation dispatch P * G at S 1 . Since the attacker optimization problem at each step models the system response, such an optimal dispatch will cause maximal power flow on the target line. Following this first cyber attack A 1 , since the generation dispatch changes at S 1 , the physical system states also change to θ * . To sustain both the optimal dispatch P * G and the false cyber topologyḠ at the next system event, i.e., S 2 , the attacker needs to maintain the false cyber loadP D by injecting another attack vector c at A 2 . Thus, the nodal power balance at attack event A 2 in the cyber layer is:
where the right hand side terms represent the cyber load modified at A 1 . In the following attack events, i.e., A t , t = 3, ..., T , the attacker can keep injecting c to maintain the false cyber loadP D . This in turn ensures that the optimal dispatch and the false cyber topology are maintained at P * G andḠ, respectively, and the maximal power flow on the target line is sustained.
To model the cyber-physical attack events A 0 , A 1 , and A 2 between S 0 and S 1 , the optimization problem should capture the power balance relationship shown in (11) . However, since the switching attack line is determined by the optimization problem, both H 1 and θ 0 are unknown before solving the problem. On the other hand, for the pure cyber attack events A 2 and A 3 , the power balance in the cyber layer is
This is equivalent to the physical power balance as
Therefore, instead of directly modeling the cyber-physical attack events A 0 , A 1 , and A 2 between S 0 and S 1 , we can model the pure cyber attack events A 2 and A 3 between S 1 and S 2 to determine the attack vector c in the first step. Such a c should be subject to bounds on both the attacker's sub-graph size and the load shifts. However, since the new topology H 1 is still not known prior to the optimization, we replace H 1 using the following equations:
where A KN is the n b ×n br branch-to-bus connectivity matrix, H 2 is the n br × n b dependency matrix between power flow and voltage angle forḠ, s is the line status vector, diag(s) represents the diagonal matrix of s, P K is the n br × 1 power flow vector. In (14), the sum of physical power flows on the set of branches connected to a bus is utilized to calculate the physical power injection at the bus. In (15), the physical power flow vector is represented by the diagonal matrix of line status vector s multiply the cyber power flow vector, i.e., H 2 θ * . That is, if a line t is selected as the switching attack line, the power flow P Kt on line t is forced to be 0, otherwise, P Kt =H 2 (t, :)·θ, whereH 2 (t, :) represents the t th row ofH 2 . With these modifications, we can then model the system and cyber attack events from A 2 through S 2 to A 3 with a twostage optimization problem, and hence, the switching attack line can also be determined as the solution of the optimization problem. After the switching attack line and the cyber attack vector c are both determined, the attack sub-graph S can be identified with the process stated in Section III. The details of this problem is described in Subsection IV-A.
In the second step, we focus on the attack vector c 0 at A 1 . We again use a two-stage optimization problem to determine the c 0 such that the optimal generation dispatch for this problem is forced to be same as that in Step 1. We, henceforth, define the attack vector solved in the second step as the initial attack vector. The details of the second step is introduced in Subsection IV-B.
The attack vectors c and c 0 are both DC attack vectors that can be detected by AC SE. Thus, to ensure the unobservability of the attacks, the attacker should construct two AC attacks with c and c 0 . This procedure is introduced in Subsection IV-C.
A. Step 1: Maximize Power Flow on A Line
In Step 1, we introduce a two-stage optimization problem to determine the attack vector c and the switching attack lines such that the target line l in the attacker's sub-graph S has maximal power flow subject to specific constraints as explained in the sequel. The two-stage optimization is given as
where C g (·) is the cost function for generator g; P G is n g × 1 active power generation vector with maximum and minimum limit P max G and P min G , respectively; P K is n br × 1 physical power flow vector with thermal limit P max K ; λ is n b × 1 dual variable vector of constraint (21); µ ∓ are n br ×1 dual variable vectors of constraint (23), respectively; α ∓ are n b × 1 dual variable vectors of constraint (24), respectively;H 1 is n b × n b dependency matrix between power injection and voltage angle forḠ;H 2 is n br × n b dependency matrix between power flow and voltage angle forḠ; P D is n b × 1 physical load vector, which has maximum load shift percentage τ ; ζ is the weight of the norm of attack vector c; L represents the set of load buses; N 0 is the maximum number of load-buses that can be attacked; N T is the maximum number of switching attack lines.
The goal of the attack in (16) is a multi-objective problem which includes maximizing the power flow on the target line l to create an overflow, while minimizing the l 0 -norm of the attack vector, i.e., minimizing the attack sub-graph size. The power flow on l is maximized along the direction of the power flow prior to attack. In the first stage, constraints (17)−(19) model the following attacker limitations: (i) only up to N T switching attack lines can be physically tripped; (ii) alter up to N 0 load-bus states; and (iii) limit cyber load shifts to at most τ P D ; respectively. The second stage optimization represents DC OPF, whose aim is to minimize operation cost in (20), subject to power balance constraints in (21) and (22), thermal limit constraint in (23), and generation limit constraint in (24).
This two-stage optimization problem is nonlinear and nonconvex. For tractability, we modify several constraints.
Constraint (22) is a nonlinear constraint which includes the product of binary variable s and continuous variable θ. It can be replaced by a linear form as follows
where β ± and γ ± are n br × 1 dual variable vectors for the corresponding constraints and M 1 is a large number.
Constraint (18) is an l 0 −norm constraint on the attack vector, which is nonlinear and non-convex. It can be relaxed to a corresponding l 1 −norm constraint as:
However, constraint (26) is still nonlinear. We, thus, linearize it as follows:
where u is n load × 1 non-negative slack variable vector. Once the attack vector determined by s and c is given in the first stage optimization problem, the second stage DCOPF problem (20)−(24) and (25) is then convex. The second stage optimization problem can then be replaced by its KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions as follows:
where constraint (28) is the partial gradient optimal condition, (29)−(32) are the complementary slackness constraints, (21)−(24) and (25) are the primal feasibility constraints, and (33) represents the dual feasibility constraints. Particularly, the complementary slackness constraints (29)−(32) are nonlinear since they include product of continuous variables. We then linearize them by introducing new binary variables δ µ ± , δ α ± , δ β ± , and δ γ ± . For instance, constraint (29) can be rewritten as
where M is a large positive number. Constraints (30)−(32) can be linearized using the same method. Particularly, for the linearized forms of constraints (31) and (32) Note that since no real-time data is required in the above optimization problem, the attacker can solve this step offline to determine the switching attack line to trip and the attack vector c.
B. Step 2: Determine Initial Attack Vector
In this step, we determine the attack vector at events A 1 . As stated earlier, c 0 , the attack vector at A 1 , is chosen to ensure that the resulting load shifts lead to the optimal dispatch solved in Step 1, i.e., P * G . To this end, we use a two-stage optimization problem similar to Step 1 to determine c 0 . Note that since the switching attack line and attack sub-graph are both determined in Step 1, the dependency matrix between power injection and voltage angle, i.e., H 1 for the physical topology G at A 1 is known to the attacker, and the cyber loads are given by (10) .
As stated in Section III, the attacker only has access to the measurements inside S. Thus, the attacker cannot directly obtain the whole system physical states θ 0 . However, assuming B S and B N S represents the set of buses inside and outside S, respectively. The vector of cyber loads resulting from an unobservable attack satisfies the following relationship:
where P 
where P * G1 is n g × 1 optimal generation vector solved in Step 1; α is n g × 1 dual variable vector of constraints (43). The objective (37) is to minimize the l 0 −norm of the attack vector. Constraint (37) represents load shift limitation. Constraints (40)−(43) represent the second stage DCOPF problem, which guarantees that the attack vector selected in the first stage leads to the optimal dispatch P * G1 . The l 0 −norm constraint can be relaxed to a linearized l 1 −norm constraint as (26). The objective can be represented as n∈L u n . This problem can then be converted to a single stage optimization problem using methods similar to those as in detailed Step 1.
C. Implementation
The method to construct an unobservable AC attack with a DC attack vector has been introduced in [11] for FDI attacks without topology alteration. In this paper, we focus on constructing AC unobservable cyber-physcial attacks. The procedure is as follows:
1) Solve the Step 1 optimization offline to obtain the switching attack line t and the attack vector c. 2) Identify the attack sub-graph S with c and line t. 
where A m GN represents the m th row of A GN , Q G represents the reactive power generation vector, G mj + iB mj is the (m, j) th entry of the bus admittance matrix, and θ mj = θ m − θj is the voltage angle difference between bus m and j,Br m is the set of branches connecting to bus m forḠ. These equations can be solved iteratively with Newton-Raphson method. 8) After updating the cyber states for the non-load buses, using equation (8) to calculate the AC attack for A 1 . 9) Repeat Steps 4)−7) (without solving Step 2 optimization) to construct AC attacks with c for A 2,...,T .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we test the effect of attacks designed with the two-step attack strategy for a nonlinear system model. The test system is the IEEE 24-bus reliable test system (RTS). We assume: (i) the system is operating under optimal power flow; and (ii) the loads of the system are constant and are equivalent to the historic load data that is assumed to be known to the attacker. To model realistic power systems, we assume that there are congestions prior to the attack and the attacker chooses one congested line as target to maximize power flow. We use MATPOWER to run AC power flow and AC OPF. The optimization problem is solved with CPLEX.
A. Solution for the attack designed with the attack strategy
The solution of the unobservable topology attack determined by the two-step attack strategy is tested in this subsection. In order to understand the worst-case effect of attacks, we assume there is a line congested prior to the physical attack. This is achieved in simulation by reducing the line rating to 95% of the base case power flow (apparent power) to create congestion. We exhaustively test all 38 lines as targets in the system and let ζ, the weight for the l 1 −norm term in the objective in (35), be 1% of the original power flow on each target line. Fig. 3 illustrates the maximal power flow (PF) and attack size (# of buses in sub-graph) for load shift bounds τ = 10%, total lines to physically attack N T = 1, and the l 1 -norm constraint N 1 = 0.06. The plot in Fig. 3(a) indicate the flow attack end of system event S 1 using attack vector from event A 1 . In Fig. 3(a) , we compare the physical power flow (apparent power, we denote it as AC PF) in each line to the power flow solved in linear model (we denote it as DC PF). In Fig. 3(b) , we plot the number of center buses, i.e., l 0 −norm of the attack vector, and the total number of buses inside the attack sub-graph for each target line.
From Fig. 3(a) we can observe that the attack vector determined by the two-stage optimization problem cause overflows in 33 target lines in linear model, i.e., 86.84% of the attacks are successful. For all such successful attacks, using the attack vector to construct an attack in the nonlinear model, in Fig.  3(a) , the AC PF in each line tracks DC PF solved with the attack strategy. In particular, 2 cases with target lines 9 and 11, respectively, have no center buses, i.e., for these lines the state-preserving attacks introduced in [6] suffice. In Fig. 3(b) , we can observe that 72.73% of the successful attacks can be launched inside a sub-graph with less than 16 total buses. In Fig. 4 , we illustrate the effect of the l 1 −norm constraint on the maximal power flow (Fig. 4(a) ), the l 1 − and the l 0 −norms of the attack vector (Figs. 4(b) and 4(c) , respectively), and the switching attack line (Fig. 4(d) ) for target line 12 solved with Step 1 optimization. In each sub-figure, we illustrate the two solutions: one with ζ (red) and the other without ζ (black) in the objective function. From Figs. 4 (a)−(c), we can see that for the solutions without l 1 −norm in objective (i.e., ζ = 0) as the l 1 −norm constraint is relaxed, the maximal target line power flow as well as the l 1 − and l 0 −norms of attack vector also increase. In contrast, for plots with the l 1 −norm in the objective, the l 1 −norm ensures that the vector with the smallest number of center buses is chosen. This in turn implies that when the l 1 −norm in the objective is tight, the resulting power flow may be smaller than that obtained without such a constraint. These differences are illustrated in Figs. 4(a)−(c) . In Fig. 4(d) , we demonstrate that the switching attack line chosen by the optimization problem changes from line 2 to line 8 as the l 1 −norm constraint is relaxed. In general, tripping line 8 requires a large load shift, and thus, is only possible for larger l 1 −norm constraint as then the cyber load changes can be distributed over a larger number of load buses in the sub-graph.
B. Consequences of the attack in the nonlinear model
In this subsection, we select a typical case to demonstrate the consequence of the unobservable state-and-topology cyberphysical attack determined by the attack strategy in the nonlinear system model. In this case, the target line is line 12 with τ = 10%, N T = 1, and N 1 = 0.06. Under this condition, the switching attack line is line 2.
For the chosen target line, after launching the physical attack at A 0 and injecting the initial cyber attack constructed with c 0 at A 1 , the active power generation dispatch for generators at bus 7 and 13 change from 215.69 MW and 230.96 MW to 200.69 MW and 245.67 MW, respectively (the dispatch of other generators remain unchanged). In the following events, as the attacker continues to inject the AC attacks constructed with attack vector c (determined by Step 1 optimization), the active power generation for these two set of generators are maintained at these values. Fig. 5 demonstrates the cyber and physical power flow variation during 20 system events. From Fig. 5 , we can observe that once the active power generation dispatch changes to the optimal dispatch and remains unchanged in the subsequent system events, the physical overflow in the target line will be maintained by injecting the AC attack constructed with attack vector c. The heat accumulation may eventually cause this line to overheat and then trip offline all the while remaining unobservable to the control center. P o w e r F l o w P e r c e n t a g e ( % ) E v e n t N u m b e r C y b e r P o w e r F l o w P e r c e n t a g e P h y s i c a l P o w e r F l o w P e r c e n t a g e We compare the load shifts caused by the attacks in both the linear and nonlinear system models and find that the load shifts in the nonlinear system model track those in the linear system model for most of the successful attacks. The only two exceptions are for lines 13 (i.e., 20% load shift on a bus) and 23 (i.e., 15% load shift on a bus).
For the successful attacks with other target lines, we observe similar attack consequences in the nonlinear model.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have introduced a class of unobservable topology attacks in which both topology data and states for a sub-graph of the network are changed by an attacker. We have proposed a two-step attack strategy to maximize the power flow on a target line subject to constraints on limited size of attack sub-graph and limited load shifts. We have shown that attacks designed with the proposed two-step attack strategy can cause physical line overloads in the IEEE 24-bus RTS even when the attack is subject to bounds on changes in load, for both linear and nonlinear models. The proportion of the successful attacks in the nonlinear system model is 86.84%, which shows the vulnerability of the system to such attacks.
A potential countermeasure is to use historical data to forecast and predict expected generation dispatch. The cyber load patterns created by the attack will in general be different from the normal load shift patterns that lead to the same dispatch plan. Thus, such forecasting can lead to detection of anomalies in both loads and dispatch.
An important extension to study is to understand the impact of attacks when the attacker has access to topology and generation data only for a sub-network. While our attack model restricts data changes to a sub-graph, it still requires the attacker to have knowledge of the complete system topology and generation data. Yet another avenue is to study the worstcase attacks that trip multiple switching attack lines and maximize power flow on multiple target lines.
